Like its counterpart, the AIIB, the NDB focuses on infrastructure projects with an authorization of up to $34 billion per year. The most founding members agreed that each member could not increase its share of capital without the agreement of the other four founding members, the Bank also allows the accession of new members, but the share of the capital of the BRICS cannot fall below the threshold of 55% (NDB, 2015). Nor does that system allow the institution to be dominated by a Member State. Perhaps the reason why many see the NDB as a competitor to the IMF lies in the detail that this new initiative also has a Reserve Contingent Arrangement (CRA). Barry Eichengreen (2011), for example, explains how long it will take for the Chinese renminbi to reach international currency status. Referring to the historical analogy of the US dollar, which managed to obtain international monetary status from 1914 to 1924; It was only in a decade that the US dollar surpassed the pound sterling and became until 1924 the first international and reserve currency (Eichengreen, 2011). In addition, he stresses that the internationalisation of the RMB must not be accompanied by the fall of the US dollar or the euro, Eichengreen said: „It is possible to complete the internationalisation process quickly if the authorities commit to it.“ Given that developments are very recent and that the Chinese institutions and political impulses cited are a new phenomenon, the literature on this subject is very limited. Duggan (2013) focuses more on the International Compensation Union (ICU) and the impact it would have on China-US relations. Empirical results suggest that an intensive care unit would have prevented deindustrialization in the United States and enabled export-oriented Chinese growth (Duggan, 2013). Therefore, it would not be necessary for the Chinese to seek other initiatives. There are related studies on the Bretton Woods system and China, Dooley (et al. 2003) verify the Bretton Woods system, and Dooley (et al., 2011) come to the idea of Bretton Woods II and argue that it still governs the international monetary system.
In addition, Eichengreen (2011) raises the possibility of internationalizing the Chinese renminbi and then taking on the challenge of the US dollar. . . .